Negative yields: A disruption in the space-time continuum
In our own recent time travel, we recall the shock and confusion of only a few years ago when negative yielding debt became a topic of conversation. Still a mind-bending concept, the collective crushing of global yields in the pandemic brought negative yielding debt to record levels. The expansive monetary policy support since has kept yields from rebounding to the same degree as risk assets have. The result is that nearly $18 trillion of debt was trading with negative yields as of the end of 2020.
Market value of negative yielding global debt
Where to find income in the future? High yield as an income source
Even with the significant rebound of non-governmental fixed income and risk assets more broadly since March 2020, high yield presents a significant yield pick-up versus other traditional fixed income.
Yield to maturity by market sector (as of February 28, 2021)
The effects of a dystopian year – did Biff steal the almanac?
U.S. high yield corporate spreads (weekly)
Distress ratios have improved since ending at 31% at the end of March 2020, declining to under 4% by the end of the year. While the issuers with distressed level spreads are concentrated in sectors such as energy, transportation and media, it is noteworthy that the energy sector had a lower distressed ratio at the end of 2020 than at the start of it.
As is typical in economic recessions (though the pandemic recession was not a typical one), corporate defaults accelerated as did credit downgrades. Also as is often the case, market action front-ran corporate fundamentals, selling off prior to the stress and rallying prior to fundamentals recovering.
High yield by credit quality
Paradoxically, in 2020, one of the largest systematic and global shocks on record, the percentage of BB in the US high yield index increased from 52% at the end of 2019 to 58% at the end of 2020. The pattern in 2020 was not the exception, but rather an acceleration of a long developing trend. Over the past two decades the percentage of BB, the highest quality echelon within high yield, has doubled from 29% to 58%. This shift is not just academic, but has real implications for default and recovery assumptions for investors going forward.
Median default rate by credit quality (1994-2020)
Altering the past?
Ironically, one of the ways in which high yield quality increased was because investment grade quality decreased. ‘Fallen Angels’, bonds originally issued as investment grade, but downgraded to high yield, eclipsed $180 billion in 2020, more than double the previous record of $70 billion set in 2016. As a percentage of the HY market, fallen angels have doubled since the end of 2019 from 8% of the index to over 16% by the end of 2020.
This impact is visible not only in quality ratings, but also in high yield fundamentals. Corporate leverage rose materially early in 2020 as would be expected with the COVID impact to earnings and subsequently with the Fed induced liquidity incentivizing issuance. Noteworthy though amidst the increase in leverage – a trend we expect will improve in the coming year as earnings and the economy rebound – is the improvement in corporate liquidity, with high yield issuers having over 75% higher cash balances since the end of 2019.
Altering the future?
It is not downgrades to high yield alone driving this trend. While the market value of BBs outstanding has increased by 32% over the past 5 years, B and CCC segments have declined by -8% and -16% over that time period. Existing bonds continue to mature or in many cases are tendered for, while new issuance has shifted to higher quality issuers in recent years.
Issuance by ratings sector
The quality of issuance is different in character than the historical composition and volume is different in scale. Issuance in 2020 set a record for the high yield market, exceeding $400 billion in issuance in the U.S., almost 45% above the prior record. Net issuance, the issuance of new bonds less those that mature or are tendered, is particularly noteworthy as bonds were called or tendered at a record pace in 2020. Net issuance of nearly $170 billion broke the prior annual record by almost 80%.
2020: A record for gross and net high yield issuance
Would you have guessed this? Even if you knew the future?
High quality high yield has outperformed equities this millenium
It could be tempting to view this performance as largely about the significant decline in rates seen during this period. However, it is coupons and interest income that have driven the returns. In fact, for the past decade, income has contributed 100% of return versus a contribution of 0% from price appreciation. For the past two decades, this pattern is more stark with a contribution of -0.94% annualized from price return and income contributing 7.66%, more than the full return of 6.72%.
High yield corporate price return versus income return (2011-2020)
Are time travel or benchmarks real?
The record issuance and volume of calls and tenders have created a high degree of turnover in benchmarks, both in absolute terms and relative to other fixed income benchmarks. At the same time, high yield has notably wider bid/ask spreads and generally lower liquidity than investment grade counterparts (though more liquidity than many higher yielding alternatives). The result is that high yield benchmarks are, depending on one’s perspective, either notoriously difficult to match or simply not representative of the investable universe.
Acknowledging at least one facet of this difficulty, the ICE family of indices has recently moved to include transaction costs in their benchmarking, noting that ”over the last 15 years, the impact of transaction costs on the U.S. High Yield Index (H0A0), including all additions and additional amounts, is an annualized -0.40%.”
To be concluded
Noting the significant recompression of spreads since March 2020, we observe the trends that put today’s spread levels in context. Distress levels have peaked and defaults are expected to decline with a more benign environment to come. Historical trends toward higher quality within high yield were amplified by the 2020 environment, leaving today’s spreads relatively more attractive versus similar levels in the past. These trends are focused on the U.S. market, but so is high yield. The U.S. high yield market comprises roughly 80% of the global high yield market, making U.S. trends essentially global.
Option adjusted spread (OAS)
High yield quality segment
This report contains our opinion as of the date the report was generated. It is for general information purposes only and is not intended to predict or guarantee the future performance of any investment, investment manager, market sector, or the markets generally. We will not update this report or advise you if there is any change in this report or our opinion. The information, ratings, and opinions in this report are based on numerous sources believed to be reliable, such as investment managers, custodians, mutual fund companies, and third-party data and service providers. We do not represent or warrant that the report is accurate or complete.
Keep in mind that as interest rates rise, prices for bonds with fixed interest rates may fall. This may have an adverse effect on a portfolio.
Foreign investing involves special risks due to factors such as increased volatility, currency fluctuation and political uncertainties. High yield bond funds may have higher yields and are subject to greater credit, market and interest rate risk than higher-rated fixed-income securities.
ICE BofA US Corporate BB – B Index is a subset of the ICE BofA US High Yield Master II Index tracking the performance of US dollar denominated below investment grade rated corporate debt publicly issued in the US domestic market. This subset includes all securities with a given investment grade rating BB – B.
The S&P 500® is an unmanaged index of large-cap common stocks. Investments cannot be made in an index.
Basis points (bps) represent 1/100th of a percent (for example: 50 bps equals 0.50%).